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THE TALMUD RULE AND THE SECUREMENT 
OF AGENTS’ AWARDS 
 









This paper provides a new characterization of the Talmud rule by means of a 
new property, called securement. This property says that any agent holding a feasible 
claim will get at least one nht of her claim, where n is the number of agents involved. We 
show that securement together with a weak version of path independence and the 
standard properties of self-duality and consistency characterize the Talmud rule. 
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A bankruptcy problem describes a situation in which an arbitrator has to
allocate a given amount of a perfectly divisible commodity among a group of
agents, when the available amount is not enough to satisfy all their claims.
Some standard examples of this type of problem are: the bankruptcy of
a ﬁrm, the execution of a will with insuﬃcient assets, the collection of a
given amount of taxes, the allocation of equities in privatized ﬁrms, the
distribution of commodities in a ﬁxed-price setting, and sharing the cost
of an indivisible public facility. A solution to a bankruptcy problem is a
procedure or “rule” that satisﬁes some desirable properties and determines,
for each speciﬁc problem, an allocation in which no agent gets more than
she claims nor less than zero. The reader is referred to the works of Young
(1994, ch. 4), Herrero & Villar (2001), Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2002)
for a review of this literature.
Diﬀerent rules are usually associated with alternative sets of properties
that represent ethical and operational principles. The object of the axiomatic
approach to bankruptcy problems is, precisely, to identify each rule with a
well deﬁned set of properties. This helps understanding the nature of the
diﬀerent solutions and their applicability. It is therefore interesting to have
alternative characterizations of the same rule, as this permits one to have
diﬀerent insights on the principles underlying the rule and on the type of
problems for which it might be suitable.
This paper follows the axiomatic approach focusing on one speciﬁcs o -
lution concept: the Talmud rule. This rule was proposed by Aumann &
Maschler (1985) as the consistent extension of the so called “contested gar-
ment rule”, a solution concept deﬁned for two-person bankruptcy problems.
The contested garment rule concedes to each agent her minimal right (to be
understood as what is left, if anything, when the other agent gets her claim
fully honored) and then divides equally the reminder. The reader is referred
to Dagan (1996) for a detailed study of this rule.
In this paper we introduce a new property, called securement,t h a tp r o -
vides a protective criterion which ensures each agent a minimal share of her
individual claim, no matter what the other claims are. More precisely, se-
curement says that any agent holding a feasible claim (a claim not larger
than the estate) will get at least one nth of her claim, where n is the number
of agents involved.
We also provide a weakening of Moulin’s (1987) notion of path indepen-
dence, called restricted path independence, that refers to the behavior of the
rule when the estate turns out to be smaller than expected, but only applies
when no claim is feasible. It requires the solution of the actual problem to
2be the same as that which takes the (unfeasible) allocation corresponding to
the division of the estimated estate as the new claims point.
We show that the only consistent rule that satisﬁes securement, restricted
path independence and self-duality is the Talmud rule. Moreover, all these
properties are independent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model and the prelim-
inary deﬁnitions are introduced in Section 2. The characterization result is
presented in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes providing further insights
on nature of the characterization result.
2M o d e l a n d d e ﬁnitions
Let N represent the set of all potential agents (a set with an inﬁnite number
of members) and let N be the family of all ﬁnite subsets of N. An element
N ∈ N describes a ﬁnite set of agents N = {1,2,...,n},w h e r ew et a k e
|N| = n.A bankruptcy problem [O’Neill (1982)] is a triple (N,E,c),
where N is the set of agents, E ∈ R+ represents the estate (the amount
to be divided), and c ∈ Rn
+ is a vector of claims whose ith component
is ci, with
 
i∈N ci >E>0. The family of all those bankruptcy problems
is B. To simplify notation we write, for any given problem (N,E,c) ∈ B,
C =
 
i∈N ci and L = C − E. We assume, without loss of generality, that
c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn.W es a yt h a tt h eith agent’s claim is feasible if ci ≤ E.
A rule is a mapping R that associates with every (N,E,c) ∈ B a unique
point R(N,E,c) ∈ Rn such that 0 ≤ R(N,E,c) ≤ c and
 
i∈N Ri(N,E,c)=
E. The point R(N,E,c) represents a desirable way of dividing E among the
agents in N so that each agent receives an award that is non-negative and
bounded above by her claim, and the entire estate is allocated.
W ef o c u sh e r eo nas p e c i ﬁcr u l e ,t h eT a l m u dr u l e[ A u m a n n&M a s c h l e r
(1985)], which is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 The Talmud (T) is the rule that, for all (N,E,c) ∈ B, and




2ci,λ} if E ≤ 1
2C
max{1
2ci,c i − µ} if E ≥ 1
2C
where λ and µ are chosen so that
 
i∈N Ti(N,E,c)=E.
Besides being the consistent extension of the contested garment rule, the
Talmud rule is a sensible allocation procedure on its own which makes the
allocation formula to depend on the relative size of the estate and the claims.
3More speciﬁcally, the Talmud rule establishes that nobody will get more than
half her claim if the estate is below half the aggregate claim, and nobody will
lose more than half her claim if the estate is above half the aggregate claim.
Let us now consider three standard properties that are satisﬁed by this
rule. The ﬁrst one, self-duality, says that gains and losses are treated on
an equal foot. The second property, bilateral consistency, stipulates that if
we apply a rule R to a given problem (N,E,c) or we do so to any of the
associated reduced two-person problems, all incumbent agents get the same
outcome. Bilateral consistency is a procedural requirement that summarizes
the following principle: what is good for the large group is also good for the
smallest one. One can also consider the converse of this property. “Converse
consistency” establishes that the way of solving a two-person problem can
be extended to any number of them. Hence, what is good for the smallest
possible group is good for larger ones. That is our third property. Formally:
Deﬁnition 2 Ar u l eR satisﬁes self-duality if, for all (N,E,c) ∈ B,F(N,E,c)=
c − F(N,C − E,c).
Deﬁnition 3 Ar u l eR satisﬁes bilateral consistency if, for all (N,E,c) ∈
B, all S ⊂ N with |S| =2 , and all i ∈ S, we have: Ri(N,E,c)=Ri(S,ES,c S),
where ES =
 
i∈S Ri(N,E,c) and cS =( ci)i∈S.
Deﬁnition 4 Ar u l eR is converse consistent if, for each (N,E,c) ∈ B
with |N| ≥ 3 and each x ∈ Rn
+ with
 
i∈N xi = E,i ff o re a c hS ⊂ N with
|S| =2 , xS = R(S,E −
 
i∈N\S xi,c S),t h e nx = R(N,E,c).
We now introduce two new properties, securement and restricted path
independence. The ﬁr s ts a y st h a te a c ha g e n th o l d i n gaf e a s i b l ec l a i ms h o u l d
receive at least one nth of her claim. This property is reminiscent of the
extreme protection criteria of exemption [Herrero & Villar (2001)], that leads
to the constrained equal awards rule. The second is a weakening of the notion
of path independence [Moulin (1987)], and refers to the behavior of the rule
when the estate turns out to be smaller than expected and no claim is feasible.
Formally:
Deﬁnition 5 A rule satisﬁes securement if, for all (N,E,c) ∈ B, ci ≤ E
implies Ri(N,E,c) ≥ 1
nci.
Securement is a property that guarantees a minimal share to those agents
holding feasible claims. Note that this share only depends on the ith agent’s
claim and the number of creditors involved. Namely, if a rule R satisﬁes this
property, agent i will know the smallest amount she can get even without
having any information on the other agents’ claims.
4Deﬁnition 6 Ar u l eR satisﬁes restricted path independence if for all
(N,E,c) ∈ B,a l lE  such that E ≤ E  ≤ c1, we have
R(N,E,c)=R[N,E,R(N,E
 ,c)].
Restricted path independence can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that
the arbitrator makes an estimate E  of the estate knowing that there is no
feasible claim in the problem, and makes a proposal R(N,E ,c). Then it
turns out that this estimate is too optimistic and the actual estate is E<
E . Restricted path independence requires that solving the actual problem
(N,E,c) produces the same outcome as that in which one takes the initial
(unfeasible) allocation of E  as the new claims point and then distributes the
actual estate E.
3 The characterization result
The following preliminary result, which is interesting on its own, shows that
in the case of two-agent problems equal treatment of equals is inferred from
self-duality, securement and restricted path independence.1
Lemma 1 For two-agent bankruptcy problems, self-duality, securement and
restricted path independence imply equal treatment of equals.
Proof.
Consider (N,E,(c1,c 2)) a two-agent bankruptcy problem, whose claims
are equal, i.e., c1 = c2 = z.L e t R be a rule satisfying self-duality, secure-
ment and restricted path independence. Let us see that R1(N,E,(z,z)) =
R2(N,E,(z,z)). Several cases are to be considered.







, for i =1 ,2.
Now, R1(N,E,(z,z)) + R2(N,E,(z,z)) = E implies that Ri(N,E,(z,z)) =
E
2,f o ri =1 ,2.
Case 2.- E<z . Let us denote by n1 the minimum positive integer for
which (1
2)n1 ·z<E . Now, let us denote by m1 the minimum positive integer
1L e tu sr e c a l lt h a tar u l eR satisﬁes equal treatment of equals if, for all (N,E,c) ∈ B,





2)j.S i n c eR satisﬁes self-duality and restricted
path independence,





 n1+1 · z ·
 m1−1
j=0 (1
2)j, E1 = E − (1





2)n1+m1 · z.S i n c e 1 ≤ min{n1,m 1},t h e nd1 ≤ 1
4z.N o t i c e t h a t n o w
E1 <d 1 and we can apply the same argument. After a ﬁnite number of
















 K·z,f o ri =1 ,2.








which implies R1(N,E,(z,z)) = R2(N,E,(z,z)).




2)j >E . Now, let us denote by s1 the minimum positive








· z.S i n c e R satisﬁes self-
duality and restricted path independence,
R(N,E,(z,z)) = (b1,b 1)+R(N,E1,(e1,e 1)),
where b1 = 1
2 · z ·
 r1
j=0(1
2)j, E1 = E − z ·
 r1
j=0(1
2)j,a n de1 =( 1
2)s1+r1+1 · z.
Since 1 ≤ min{r1,s 1},t h e ne1 ≤ 1
4z.N o t i c et h a tn o w E1 >e 1 and we can

















 K · z,f o ri =1 ,2.








which implies R1(N,E,(z,z)) = R2(N,E,(z,z)).
The main result of the paper is the following:
6Theorem 1 A bankruptcy rule R satisﬁes bilateral consistency, self-duality,
securement and restricted path independence if and only if it is the Talmud
rule.
Proof.
It is well known that the Talmud rule satisﬁes bilateral consistency and
self-duality [e.g. Herrero & Villar (2001)]. Let us ﬁrst see that the Talmud
rule satisﬁes securement and restricted path independence, and then prove
the converse implication.
(i) T satisﬁes securement.
Let i ∈ N be such that ci ≤ E. As the property trivially holds when
E ≥ 1
2C, let us assume that E ≤ 1
2C. In this case, Ti(N,E,c)=m i n {1
2ci,λ}.
Now suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that Ti(N,E,c)=λ < 1
nci ≤ 1
2ci.
Thus, λ < E
n. Now, for all k ≥ i we have ck ≥ ci, which implies that 1
2ck > λ
and therefore Tk(N,E,c)=λ < E



















k=1 Tk(N,E,c) > i−1
n E.S i n c eTk(N,E,c) ≥ 0, for all k ∈ N,t h e n
there exists some k0 ≤ i − 1 such that Tk0(N,E,c) > E
n > λ = Tn(N,E,c),
which is a contradiction, since T is an order preserving rule [c.f. Aumann &
Maschler (1985)].
(ii) T satisﬁes restricted path independence.
Let (N,E,c), (N,E ,c) ∈ B be such that c1 ≥ E  ≥ E. Then, E ≤ E  ≤
1
2C,w h i c hi m p l i e sTi (N,E,c)=m i n {1
2ci,λ} and Ti (N,E ,c)=m i n {1
2ci,λ
 }
for all i ∈ N,w h e r eλ and λ
  are chosen so that
 
i∈N Ti (N,E,c)=E,a n d  
i∈N Ti (N,E ,c)=E .










2c1 ≤ E ≤ C − n
2c1
c1 − C−E
n if C − n
2c1 ≤ E
.( 1 )
Since c1 ≥ E,a n da c c o r d i n gt o( 1 ) ,T1 (N,E,c)=E
n.T h u s ,E
n = λ < 1
2c1
and therefore Ti (N,E,c)=E
n, for all i ∈ N. Analogously, Ti (N,E ,c)=E
n ,
for all i ∈ N. Consequently, since the Talmud rule satisﬁes equal treatment of
equals, Ti (N,E,T (N,E ,c)) = E
n,f o ra l li ∈ N.T h u s ,Ti (N,E,T (N,E ,c)) =
Ti (N,E,c) for all i ∈ N,a sd e s i r e d .
7(iii) Bilateral consistency, self-duality, securement and restricted path in-
dependence imply the Talmud rule.
F i r s tn o t et h a tt h eT a l m u dr u l ei sc o nverse consistent. Therefore, it
is enough to prove the result for the two-agent case and then invoke the
‘Elevator Lemma’ [c.f. Thomson (1996)] to prove the result.2
Let R be a rule that satisﬁes all those properties. Lemma 1 ensures that
R also satisﬁes equal treatment of equals. Without loss of generality let
(N,E,c) be a bankruptcy problem with N = {1,2}, and c1 ≤ c2. In these















if c1 ≤ E ≤ c2  
c1 − C−E
2 ,c 2 − C−E
2
 
if c2 ≤ E
.( 2 )
There are several cases to be discussed.
Case 1.- c1 ≤ E ≤ c2.
Since c1 ≤ E and R satisﬁes securement then R1(N,E,c) ≥ c1
2 .F u r t h e r -
more, E ≤ c2 is equivalent to saying that c1 ≤ L = C − E. Thus, secure-
ment also implies that R1(N,L,c) ≥ c1
2 .N o w , s i n c e R is a self dual rule,
R1(N,E,c)=c1−R1(N,L,c) ≤
c1









Case 2.- E<c 1.
Thanks to Case 1, c  = R(N,c1,c)=( c1
2 , c1
2 ).N o w , s i n c e R satisﬁes






= T (N,E,c).F i n a l l y ,
R(N,E,c )=R(N,E,c), thanks to restricted path independence.
Case 3.- c2 <E .





. By self-duality, R(N,L,c)=c − R(N,E,c).T h u s , R(N,E,c)=  
c1 − L





Three diﬀerent questions are analyzed in this section, in order to dwell on the
nature of the result in Theorem 1. The ﬁrst refers to the speciﬁcity of the
securement property, which is the main ingredient of the characterization
result (one may wonder whether this is an ad hoc property that only the
Talmud rule satisﬁes, among the rules which are standard in the literature).
The second regards the logical independence of the properties in the Theorem
2The ‘Elevator Lemma’ says that if a bilaterally consistent rule coincides with a con-
versely consistent rule in the two-agent case, coincidence holds in general.
8(the tightness of the characterization). Finally, the third deals with the
comparison with other characterization results in the literature (namely: is
it really a diﬀerent characterization?).
To answer all these questions we analyze the performance of three well
known rules with respect to the four properties in Theorem 1. These rules
are the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule and the adjusted
proportional rule.3 They are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 7 The proportional rule (P) yields for all (N,E,c) ∈ B, and





Deﬁnition 8 The constrained equal awards rule (A) yields for all (N,E,c) ∈
B, and all i ∈ N:
Ai(N,E,c)=m i n {ci,λ},
where λ is chosen so that
 
i∈N Ai(N,E,c)=E.
In order to deﬁne properly the adjusted proportional rule, we need an
additional piece of notation. Given a bankruptcy problem (N,E,c) ∈ B,w e
deﬁne its vector of minimal rights as m(N,E,c)=( mi (N,E,c))i∈N,a n di t s
vector of truncated claims as t(N,E,c)=( ti (N,E,c))i∈N,w h e r e
mi (N,E,c)=m a x {0,E−
 
j∈N−{i}
cj} for all i ∈ N,a n d
ti (N,E,c)=m i n {ci,E} for all i ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 9 The adjusted proportional rule (AP) yields, for all (N,E,c) ∈





where P is the proportional rule.
In words: the AP rule assigns ﬁrst to each agent her minimal right.
Second, each agent’s claim is revised down to the minimum of the remainder
and the diﬀerence between her initial claim and her minimal right. Finally,
the remainder is divided proportionally to the revised claims. This rule was
originally introduced by Curiel, Maschler & Tijs (1987) as the corresponding
rule to a classical solution concept of cooperative games: the τ−value.
The next results follow:
3We do not include in the discussion the constrained equal losses rule because it trivially
fails to satisfy securement, as there are problems for which agents with positive claims
receive nothing.
9Proposition 1 The proportional rule satisﬁes bilateral consistency, self-duality
and restricted path independence, and fails to satisfy securement.
Proof.
It is straightforward to show that the proportional rule is a bilaterally
consistent and self-dual rule which satisﬁes path independence. In partic-
ular, it also satisﬁes restricted path independence. However, it does not
satisfy securement. To see this, consider the bankruptcy problem B =




Proposition 2 The constrained equal awards rule satisﬁes bilateral consis-
tency, securement, and restricted path independence, and fails to satisfy self-
duality.
Proof.
The constrained equal awards rule is a bilaterally consistent rule that sat-
isﬁes path independence [c.f. Herrero & Villar (2001, Th. 2)]. In particular,
it also satisﬁes restricted path independence. Let us see that securement is
also fulﬁlled. Let i ∈ N be such that ci ≤ E. For the sake of contradic-
tion, let us suppose that Ai(N,E,c)=λ < 1
nci <c i.T h u s , λ < E
n.N o w ,
for all k ≥ i we have ck ≥ ci, which implies that ck > λ and therefore
Ak(N,E,c)=λ < E



















k=1 Ak(N,E,c) > i−1
n E.S i n c eAk(N,E,c) ≥ 0, for all k ∈ N,t h e n
there exists some k0 ≤ i − 1 such that Ak0(N,E,c) > E
n > λ = An(N,E,c),
which is a contradiction, since A is an order preserving rule [c.f. Moreno-
Ternero & Villar (2001, Proposition 2)].
Finally, it is well known that the constrained equal losses rule is the dual
rule of A [c.f. Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2001, Corollary 1)] which implies
that A is not a self-dual rule.
Proposition 3 The adjusted proportional rule satisﬁes self-duality, secure-
ment and restricted path independence, and does not satisfy bilateral consis-
tency.
Proof.
Curiel, Maschler & Tijs (1987, Th. 4) show that AP is a self-dual rule.
It is straightforward to show that it also satisﬁes equal treatment of equals,
10a property that will be useful to show the fulﬁllment of restricted path inde-
pendence.
Let (N,E,c), (N,E ,c) ∈ B be such that c1 ≥ E  ≥ E. If such is the case,
then mi (N,E,c)=mi (N,E ,c)=0 , ti (N,E,c)=E and ti (N,E ,c)=
E , for all i ∈ N.T h u s , APi(N,E,c)=Pi(N,E,(E,...,E)) = E
n for all
i ∈ N.F u r t h e r m o r e , APi(N,E ,c)=Pi(N,E ,(E ,...,E )) = E
n for all
i ∈ N. Now, by equal treatment of equals, APi(N,E,APi(N,E ,c)) =
APi(N,E,(E
n ,..., E
n )) = E
n for all i ∈ N. Altogether shows that AP sat-
isﬁes restricted path independence.
To see that AP satisﬁes securement, let (N,E,c) ∈ B and i ∈ N be such
that ci ≤ E.L e tj ∈ N be the ﬁrst creditor whose minimal right is strictly
positive, i.e., j is such that cj−1 ≤ L<c j. In other words, mk (N,E,c)=0





k=1 ck +( n − j)L. It is then straightforward to
show that E −
 









λ · ck for all k =1 ,...,j − 1










It is straightforward to show that λ ≥ 1
n.N o w ,i fi ≤ j−1 then APi(N,E,c)=
λ · ci ≥ 1
n · ci,a sd e s i r e d .I f ,o nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,i ≥ j then


























which shows that AP satisﬁes securement.
Finally, note that AP is a rule that coincides with the Talmud rule in the
two-agent case. Since both are diﬀerent rules, it follows from the “Elevator
lemma” that it cannot be bilaterally consistent.
These Propositions show that there are rules that satisfy all the proper-
ties of the characterization result except securement (the proportional rule),
11rules that satisfy all the properties except self-duality (the constrained equal
awards rule), and rules that satisfy all the properties except bilateral con-
sistency (the adjusted proportional rule). To complete the analysis of the
tightness of the characterization result we have to show that there are also
rules that satisfy all the properties except restricted path independence. The
following example illustrates this case and closes de discussion of the logical
independence of the properties.
Example 1 Assume that we restrict our attention to the subset of two-agent
bankruptcy problems. Without loss of generality assume N = {1,2} and
c1 ≤ c2. Consider the following rule:
R(N,E,c)=

    
    





2 ) if c1
2 ≤ E ≤ c1
(c1
2 ,E− c1
2 ) if c1 ≤ E ≤ c2
(E − c2 + c1
2 ,c 2 − c1
2 ) if c2 ≤ E ≤ c2 + c1
2
(c1,E− c1) if c2 +
c1
2 ≤ E
R satisﬁes (vacuously) bilateral consistency.4 It is straightforward to show
that R is a self dual rule that satisﬁes securement. However, R does not
satisfy restricted path independence. Consider the vector of claims c =( 4 ,5),
and the estates E =1and E  =3 . Observe that R(N,E,c)=( 0 ,1) and
R(N,E ,c)=( 1 ,2).T h u s , R(N,E,R(N,E ,c)) = R(N,1,(1,2)) = (1
2, 1
2).
As a result, R(N,E,c)  = R(N,E,R(N,E ,c)).
Finally, we compare the characterization result provided here with other
characterization results that appear in the literature. More precisely, let us
refer to the work of Dagan (1996), who shows that the Contested Garment
r u l ei st h eo n l yt w o - p e r s o nr u l et h a ts a t i s ﬁes self-duality and composition
from minimal rights.5 From this result it follows that the Talmud rule is the
only rule on B satisfying bilateral consistency, self-duality and composition
from minimal rights.6 Proposition 2 shows that rule A is a bilaterally con-
s i s t e n tr u l et h a ts a t i s ﬁes securement. Yet, it does not satisfy composition
from minimal rights [c.f. Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2001, Proposition 3)].
4This line of argument has already been used by Moulin (2000).
5This property says that for every (N,E,c) ∈ B, F(N,E,c)=m(N,E,c)+F(N,E −  
mi (N,E,c),c−m(N,E,c)).
6He also shows that the Contested Garment rule is the only two-person rule that sat-
isﬁes self-duality and independence of claims truncation (resp. equal treatment of equals,
independence of claims truncation and composition from minimal rights), where indepen-
dence of claims truncation means that F(N,E,c)=F(t(N,E,c)), for all (N,E,c) ∈ B.
Applying bilateral consistency one gets the extension to the Talmud rule.
12Moreover, if we drop bilateral consistency, there are self-dual rules that sat-
isfy both securement and composition from minimal rights which are not the
Talmud rule (Proposition 3). The proportional rule is self-dual and bilater-
ally consistent and satisﬁes neither securement nor composition from minimal
rights. Therefore the property of securement is logically independent of that
of composition from minimal rights: it neither implies nor prevents the other
property to be satisﬁed by a rule. As a consequence, the characterization re-
sult in Theorem 1 is genuinely diﬀerent from that derived from the consistent
extension of Dagan’s results.
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